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ABSTRACT 
Scotland is typically regarded as a mixed jurisdiction based on 
an assessment of its combination of civilian and common law 
traditions. If this narrow definition of “mixture” is opened up, one 
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will find several other traditions which are constituent parts of the 
Scottish legal tradition. Those range from the seemingly remote 
Celtic and udal law, through feudal and canon law, to the law of 
the European Union and the European Convention on Human 
Rights. An holistic approach to the question of mixture requires 
that each of these traditions is accounted for, especially because of 
the difficulties in assessing the legacy of any given tradition. Those 
difficulties are exacerbated by the fact that legal traditions are 
indiscrete or “impure”, having been the subject of influence, 
modification, contamination, borrowing and so forth. They have 
mixed with other traditions, and some have conveyed parts of 
others. By focusing on the civilian and common law traditions, we 
risk adopting a reductionist approach to the question of mixture by 
essentially excluding vital parts of the story: which other traditions 
were (or are) part of the mixture, which parts disappeared or were 
subsumed into other traditions, which aspects of one tradition were 
conveyed by another. An holistic approach also recommends that 
the predominantly private law oriented focus of the literature is 
opened up to analysis of public law and criminal law. That will 
likely bring out further aspects which show that the pedigree of 
Scots law is a mixture, not only of civilian and common law 
ingredients, but also of other diverse traditions. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Scotland is often described as a “mixed” jurisdiction. Whilst 
some have claimed that it is the only such system in Europe,1 
others may disagree with that proposition.2 We are told, at any 
rate, that Scotland is the oldest among those jurisdictions 
comprising the world's “third” legal family.3  
 1.  Hector L. MacQueen, Mixed Jurisdictions and Convergence: Scotland, 
29 INT'L J. LEGAL INFO. 309, 310 (2001). 
 2.  See, for example, arguments advanced that Cyprus and Malta are also 
mixed systems—see, respectively, Nikitas E. Hatzimihail, Cyprus as a Mixed 
Legal System, 6 J. CIV. L. STUD. 37; and Kevin Aquilina, The Nature and 
Sources of the Maltese Mixed Legal System: A Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and 
Mr. Hyde?, 4 COMP. L. REV. 1 (2013). 
 3.  VERNON VALENTINE PALMER, MIXED JURISDICTIONS WORLDWIDE: 
THE THIRD LEGAL FAMILY 5 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2001); Mauro Bussani & 
Vernon Valentine Palmer, The Liability Regimes of Europe – Their Façades and 
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That may be so under a specific casting of the mixed 
jurisdiction category, principally understood as one combining 
civilian and common law traditions. In that sense, Konrad 
Zweigert and Hein Kötz argued that “Scots law deserves particular 
attention from comparative lawyers as a special instance of the 
symbiosis of the English and Continental legal traditions.”4 That 
may be understood within what has been said to be “characteristic 
of mixed jurisdictions,” namely “to retain private civil law within a 
surrounding system of Anglo-American public law.”5 T.B. Smith 
described the mixed jurisdiction as “basically a civilian system that 
had been under pressure from the Anglo-American common law 
and has in part been overlaid by that rival system of 
jurisprudence.”6 Similarly, Niall Whitty described it as usually 
meaning “a civilian system overlaid by the common law.”7  
Whilst this civilian and common law dichotomy would 
inevitably place Scotland in a “mixed” category, it represents just 
one perspective on the concept of “mixture”. If we reconsider what 
it is that constitutes mixture, in particular by forcing the definition 
open beyond a simple civilian and common law antithesis, might 
we change our view of the extent to which Scotland is a mixed 
jurisdiction, or whether it is a special case among jurisdictions in 
being “mixed”? 
The question becomes one of what, exactly, is being mixed? As 
Esin Örücü has pointed out, not all mixed systems would be 
Interiors in PURE ECONOMIC LOSS IN EUROPE 143 (Mauro Bussani & Vernon 
Valentine Palmer eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2003). 
 4.  KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO 
COMPARATIVE LAW 204 (3d ed., Tony Weir trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1998). 
 5.  BUSSANI AND PALMER, supra note 3, at 143. 
 6.  T.B. Smith, The Preservation of the Civilian Tradition in “Mixed 
Jurisdictions” in CIVIL LAW IN THE MODERN WORLD 2-3 (A.N. Yiannopoulos 
ed., Louisiana State Univ. Press 1965). 
 7.  Niall R. Whitty, The Civilian Tradition and Debates on Scots Law, 
TYDSKRIF VIR DIE SUID-AFRIKAANSE REG 227, 232 (1996). 
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mixtures of the same ingredients.8 This fact has not gone unnoticed 
in the literature. Vernon Palmer proposed three principal 
characteristics by which mixed jurisdictions might be identified. 
First, they should be “built upon dual foundations of common-law 
and civil-law materials,” and even although other systems “present 
diverse mixes,” including traditions of religious law, indigenous 
custom and so on, “common law and civil law [should] constitute 
the basic building blocks of the legal edifice.”9 Second, the 
presence of these dual elements should be “obvious to an ordinary 
observer.”10 Third, there is a structural allocation of content: “the 
civil law will be cordoned off within the field of private law, thus 
creating the distinction between private continental law and public 
Anglo-American law.”11 Notwithstanding Palmer's definition, 
which marks off the “mixed jurisdiction” from jurisdictions with 
traditions otherwise mixed, the basic analytical framework still 
draws on a civilian and common law dichotomy.12  
In Scotland, it is well documented that there is a mixture of 
civilian and common law traditions.13 However, if one were able to 
reach into the legal system and remove the civilian and common 
law components, would all of its content have been extracted? The 
answer to that must be firmly negative. If one is receptive to the 
footprint or legacy of other legal traditions in Scots law, they will 
find them. Those other traditions, too, are part of the mixture; one 
 8.  See Esin Örücü, What is a Mixed Legal System: Exclusion or 
Expansion?, 12 ELECTRONIC J. COMP. L. 1, 4 (2008). 
 9.  PALMER, supra note 3, at 7-8. 
 10.  Id. at 8. 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Palmer has acknowledged the limitations of a straight civilian and 
common law dichotomy. He also outlined the difference in approach between 
scholars studying mixture within the civilian and common law framework—
whom he described as “scholars in the classic mixed jurisdiction tradition,” and 
those of a more liberal persuasion who may be regarded as legal pluralists. See 
Vernon Valentine Palmer, Mixed Legal Systems – The Origin of the Species, 28 
TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 103 (2013). 
 13.  See, for example, Robin Evans-Jones, Receptions of Law, Mixed Legal 
Systems and the Myth of the Genius of Scots Private Law, 114 L.Q. REV. 228 
(1998); W.D.H. Sellar, Scots Law: Mixed from the Very Beginning? A Tale of 
Two Receptions, 4(1) EDIN. L. REV. 3 (2000); and Whitty, supra note 7. 
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which is in Scotland revealed as much more diverse than the initial 
hybrid of civilian and common law traditions may have suggested. 
Moreover, even if those comprise the two principal traditions in 
Scots law, it will be asked whether a quantitative approach is 
appropriate. 
This article considers the mixed quality of Scots law and the 
Scottish legal tradition in four contexts, each of which is intended 
to point to a deeper and fuller concept of mixture in the mixed 
jurisdiction analysis. 
The first is an historical perspective: if the civilian and 
common law traditions are not the only traditions which have left a 
legacy in the Scottish legal order, what others might be identified? 
This section gives a brief and non-exhaustive outline of other 
traditions which have featured in the evolving Scottish legal 
tradition, namely Scottish common law, feudal law, canon law, 
udal law, Celtic law, the Bible, and foreign maritime law. 
Second, the argument is made that an “updated” view of mixed 
jurisdiction must take account of the extent to which two major 
streams of law have permeated Scots law in more modern times — 
those of the European Union (EU) and the European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR). These cannot be excluded from the 
analysis, and whilst they may constitute part of the mixture in any 
jurisdiction to which they relate, that fact alone necessarily 
distinguishes those jurisdictions from the majority of the world's 
jurisdictions where neither EU law nor ECHR law is applicable. 
Moreover, the particular character and structural features of EU 
and ECHR law are such that they do not receive monolithic, 
uniform application in each jurisdiction. They gain the colouring of 
local institutional and normative features which vary among 
jurisdictions. 
The third aspect discussed is one of methodology: an holistic 
approach is required for the question of mixed jurisdiction. It 
should be asked whether a quantitative, or some other, framework 
of analysis is preferred for evaluating whether and to what extent 
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individual constituent traditions should feature in the discussion. 
Consideration should be given to how one accounts for temporal 
dimensions, how one addresses the question of legacy, and the 
extent to which legal traditions are indiscrete or “impure”. This 
section will reflect on these issues. 
Fourth, it is suggested that the extent to which private law 
analysis has dominated mixed jurisdiction scholarship has the 
potential to misrepresent, or only partially represent, the nature of 
the law and legal system in general. In particular, the discussion 
may be said to take insufficient account of public law, criminal law 
and other areas which lie beyond the field of private law. The risk 
arises that jurisdictions are in general classified according to 
definitions and analyses conducted along private law fault lines. 
The suggested outcome is that, if and until other areas of law are 
properly accounted for, it may be appropriate for the private law 
literature to explicitly confine itself to private law, and be cautious 
about purporting to speak to the nature of the wider law and legal 
system in general terms. 
The view taken by this article is very much a general one 
which aims to address Scots law and the Scottish legal system at 
their widest extent. That position is purposely taken, both as a 
response to the tendency of the mixed jurisdiction literature to 
focus on a private law analysis,14 and because there appears little 
reason in principle to begin with a magnified view of any one 
substantive area of law (such as private law) and to recede from 
that point to a more general analysis. An alternative approach may 
have been to move from the principal focus of the literature—
private law—out to a more general analysis, however that would 
reinforce the notion that private law is the natural starting point for 
the discussion, and the article seeks to contest that idea; at least 
until (should one be forthcoming) a convincing explanation is 
given as to why private law should be the main focus of an holistic 
 14.  See infra section IV. 
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mixed jurisdiction discussion which can faithfully be said to 
address the general law and legal system at large. The article 
therefore raises a series of questions which it is hoped will feed 
into a discussion on the proper parameters and methodology of the 
mixed jurisdiction commentary. 
By final word of introduction, this article is concerned with 
“sources” in the sense of the pedigree of law—that is to say, 
streams or currents of legal tradition. It does not discuss “sources” 
in the sense of resources of law, such as legislation and the 
common law, although these are often the media through which 
legal traditions are conveyed.  
II. TRADITIONS OF LAW IN SCOTLAND: HISTORICAL 
In line with the principal orientation of the mixed jurisdiction 
literature on a civilian and common law axis, the contemporary 
debate on the mixed character of Scots law has primarily been 
conducted on the same axis. 
Even if the civilian and common law elements were the main 
contributors to Scots law and the Scottish legal tradition as now 
understood, it is perhaps surprising that such little attention has 
been given to other contributing traditions in the context of a 
mixed jurisdiction analysis. The accent on civilian and common 
law elements is subject to a range of possible criticisms: it is too 
simplistic an analysis; it is reductionist; it suggests that these are 
pure and discrete traditions; it is a Eurocentric analysis (and 
therefore ill-suited for application in a global comparative law 
context);15 and so on. The reductionist criticism is particularly 
instructive because it points to the fact that in measuring a system 
with a civilian and common law yardstick, the legacy of other 
traditions is essentially left out of the discussion. That legacy may 
manifest directly in the Scottish legal tradition, or even indirectly 
 15.  Andrew Harding, Global Doctrine and Local Knowledge: Law in South 
East Asia, 51 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 35, 49 (2002). 
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through another tradition—including through the civilian and 
common law traditions.  
This section outlines some of the other traditions which jostle 
for recognition of their own respective places within the Scottish 
legal tradition. Rather than attempting to restate the effect of the 
civilian and common law traditions in Scotland, the opportunity 
will instead be taken to give an overview of traditions with a less 
remarked footprint. The traditions identified are not exhaustive—
this is a necessarily brief overview, but should give a taste of the 
plurality and variety of those traditions. 
A. Scottish Common Law 
When the “common law” is discussed in the Scottish context, 
reference is typically made either to the common law tradition 
deriving from England, or common law as a non-statutory resource 
of law.  
There is recognised to have been, however, a Scottish 
“common law” in the sense of a more indigenous common law 
tradition inherited in the mediaeval period. This likely comprised 
significant elements derived from the English common law 
tradition, but with Scottish usages, additions and innovations. This 
would precede the main period of civil law reception in Scotland, 
as well as the main period of common law reception. 
The common law of Scotland16 was a feature of the historical 
circumstances of the kingdom, and whilst it would include aspects 
of other legal traditions—such as English common law, mediaeval 
Roman law and canon law influences—there is also recognised to 
have been a body of “native Scottish customs,” the first known 
reference to that “common law” being in a royal brieve from 
 16.  Noting that the approximate geopolitical territory of Scotland as now 
understood took shape from around the 9th to the 13th centuries. See also infra 
note 90. 
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1264.17 This law was “common” in the sense that it derived from 
customs common to the various peoples who together made up the 
people of the Scottish kingdom.18 The mediaeval Parliament of 
Scotland not only enacted programmatic statutes, with their 
connotations of positivity, but also expressed the accumulated 
customs—the “common law”—of the realm.19  
Custom should be understood as an important source (or 
expression) of “law” in earlier periods in Scotland; indeed, as it 
was elsewhere in Europe. David Ibbetson identified three senses in 
which the term “custom” (consuetudo) can be understood in the 
context of mediaeval Europe. First, it refers in its least technical 
sense to the way in which a social group orders its affairs; the way 
in which things are done. Second, custom is distinguishable from 
lex: whilst lex is written law (ius scriptum), custom is unwritten 
(ius non scriptum). They are, however, complementary, in the 
sense that lex can record customs, clarify them or recognize them 
as authentic or authoritative. Third, custom is distinguished from 
lex, but rather than being understood as complementary, lex 
prevails: it conditions custom.20  
The importance of custom in the specifically Scottish context 
comes through in several senses.  
First, the kingdom was not socially or demographically 
cohesive, at least to the extent that it would become: custom was 
therefore about drawing out “the way things were done” from a 
variety of social groups. Second, jurisdiction was scattered through 
a broad array of courts, officials and other bodies. Their 
jurisdiction was sometimes overlapping or even competing, and 
they were not united in a defined jurisdictional hierarchy: practices 
 17.  A.M. GODFREY, CIVIL JUSTICE IN RENAISSANCE SCOTLAND: THE 
ORIGINS OF A CENTRAL COURT 18 (Brill 2009). 
 18.  THE LAWS OF SCOTLAND: STAIR MEMORIAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA, Vol. 22, 
para. 359, Butterworths LexisNexis. 
 19.  See GODFREY, supra note 17, at 18. 
 20.  David Ibbetson, Custom in Medieval Law in THE NATURE OF 
CUSTOMARY LAW 153-155 (Amanda Perreau-Saussine & James Bernard 
Murphy eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2007). 
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and usages common to these fora could therefore be regarded as 
customs in a broader sense. Third is the related fact that there was 
no centralised, characteristically judicial forum until the 
establishment of the Court of Session (or College of Justice) in 
1532: until then, no single judicial institution had the capacity and 
jurisdiction to regularize the application and implementation of law 
throughout the kingdom. Underlying patterns or commonalities 
therefore pointed to customs in the realm. Fourth, Parliament was 
not purely a legislative body as now understood. Not only did it 
perform an additional, adjudicative function, its statutes were not 
always programmatic in nature. Instead, they often promulgated 
and gave regularised form to existing customs. Finally, the 
resources of law were not widely recorded in writing. The “way 
things were done” would therefore embody a bottom-up, 
constitutive approach to custom, rather than a top-down, 
prescriptive approach expressed in legal writings. 
The common law of Scotland was not confined to substantive 
content, but necessarily entailed more structural aspects, especially 
in the context of the emergence of a general framework or system 
of jurisdiction across the kingdom. Mark Godfrey has written 
extensively on this subject in the context of the emergence of the 
Court of Session as a supreme civil court in Scotland in the 16th 
century.21 The ultimate normative authority of the monarch was 
essentially the unifying factor in an array of jurisdictions, exercised 
by a multitude of persons, officials and bodies, the jurisdictions of 
which were, as noted, sometimes overlapping or even competing. 
The common law would in this context emerge through common 
practices or applications of law, or the manner in which remedies 
were awarded. The various jurisdictions hung together under a 
general governing role exercised by the King in Council and 
Parliament, but the mediaeval common law context facilitated the 
systematization of the legal order and its movement toward an 
 21.  See generally GODFREY, supra note 17. 
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overall structure, both in terms of jurisdictional hierarchy and 
structural coherence.22 Hector MacQueen has powerfully argued 
that the pleadable brieves of right, mortancestry and novel 
dissasine occupied a central place in the development of a Scottish 
common law, and that they were in use in Scotland (modelled on 
English equivalents) from prior to 1300 until the 15th century or 
later.23  
The main, early repository of the Scottish common law was the 
Regiam Majestatem. Whilst based on the English text De legibus et 
consuetudinibus regni Angliae attributed to Ranulf de Glanvill 
(itself an expression of English common law), Regiam Majestatem 
also incorporated materials from the Romano-Canonical tradition 
and other early resources,24 in addition to containing a significant 
body of feudal material.25 The date of origin of the text (or texts) is 
disputed, though it may have been compiled in the early 14th 
century, or even have been older in nature.26 It is regarded as the 
most important statement of Scots law in that period, though it is 
supplemented by other texts including Quoniam Attachiamenta, 
and the older, 13th century, Leges Quatuor Burgorum. Regiam 
Majestatem has itself been referred to in a few cases from the 20th 
and 21st centuries. It has, for example, been cited with reference to 
guardianship,27 testamentary succession,28 reparation,29 the 
 22.  GODFREY, supra note 17, at 269. 
 23.  See generally HECTOR L. MACQUEEN, COMMON LAW AND FEUDAL 
SOCIETY IN MEDIEVAL SCOTLAND (Edinburgh Univ. Press 1993). 
 24.  THE LAWS OF SCOTLAND: STAIR MEMORIAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA, Vol. 22, 
para. 360, Butterworths LexisNexis. 
 25.  Id. at paras. 366 and 551. 
 26.  Id. at para. 360. 
 27.  Law Hospital NHS Trust v Lord Advocate, 1996 S.C. 301 at 323, per 
Lord Clyde. 
 28.  Clark's Executor v Clark, 1943 S.C. 216 at 223, per Lord Justice-Clerk 
Cooper. 
 29.  McKendrick v Sinclair, 1972 S.C. (H.L.) 25 at 56, per Lord Simon of 
Glaisdale. 
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criminal liability of married persons,30 and the criminal offence of 
rape.31  
B. Feudal Law 
As noted, Regiam Majestatem contained a significant body of 
feudal material, indicating the presence or legacy of feudalism in 
this earlier period in Scotland. Whilst it is unclear when feudalism 
arrived in Scotland, it may have been as early as the end of the 
11th century,32 though it has also been attributed to the reign of 
King David I of Scotland, which spanned 1124-1153.33 The idea 
was that all land belonged to the Crown, and was “feued” out to 
vassals, often capable of further “subfeuing”. This was in return for 
services—originally of “men at arms” and produce, or of 
commodities, and then for monetary payments called feu duties.34  
From the reign of David I onward, the reach of feudalism was 
gradually extended in Scotland with the effect of strengthening 
royal control over the territory.35 Although there continued to exist 
pre-feudal estates and lordships, and the campaign of 
“feudalization” may have had less impact on lower levels of 
society in the 12th and 13th centuries,36 feudal charters could grant 
rights of jurisdiction, particularly manifesting in regality and 
barony courts (so-called “franchise courts”).37 Although franchise 
 30.  Miln v Stirton, 1982 S.L.T. (Sh Ct) 11 at 11. 
 31.  Lord Advocate's Reference No. 1 of 2001, 2002 S.L.T. 466 at para. 22, 
per Lord McCluskey. 
 32.  THE LAWS OF SCOTLAND: STAIR MEMORIAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA, 
Conveyancing Reissue, Butterworths LexisNexis, para. 5. 
 33.  Hector L. MacQueen, Tears of a Legal Historian, JUR. REV. 1, 4-7 
(2003). 
 34.  THE LAWS OF SCOTLAND: STAIR MEMORIAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA, 
Conveyancing Reissue, para. 5. 
 35.  MacQueen, supra note 33, at 5-7. 
 36.  See id. at 14-17.  
 37.  See, for example, THE LAWS OF SCOTLAND: STAIR MEMORIAL 
ENCYCLOPAEDIA, Criminal Procedure Second Reissue, paras. 20-22. Heritable 
jurisdiction was substantially abolished by the Heritable Jurisdictions (Scotland) 
Act 1746. On charter grants in a Scottish common law context, see, for example, 
John Hudson, Legal Aspects of Scottish Charter Diplomatic in the Twelfth 
Century: A Comparative Approach, 25 ANGLO-NORMAN STUD. 121 (2002). 
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jurisdiction was regarded as being distinct from the grant of land 
itself, with the jurisdiction being heritable,38 feudalism clearly had 
important consequences for the manner in which the law and legal 
system39 were organised.  
The system of feudal tenure was not abolished until November 
28, 2004.40 Whilst the Abolition of Feudal Tenure etc. (Scotland) 
Act 2000 proclaimed that the “feudal system of land tenure, that is 
to say the entire system whereby land is held by a vassal on 
perpetual tenure from a superior is, on the appointed day, 
abolished,”41 this was in fact the end stage in a series of 
abolitionary steps stretching back over several centuries.42 In the 
wake of feudal tenure came fresh legislation relating to title 
conditions and tenemental properties,43 dealing with specific 
proprietorial issues which would arise on the abolition of feudal 
tenure.  
Kenneth Reid has described the legacy of feudal tenure in 
Scotland as “less than might be supposed,” noting that the 
abolition of feudal tenure brings “the most substantial reception of 
Roman law in Scotland since the seventeenth century.” One 
exception to this is the legacy of the affirmative real burden,44 a 
form of condition on the development of land, which Reid 
described as “a permanent legacy of the feudal era.”45  
 
 38.  THE LAWS OF SCOTLAND: STAIR MEMORIAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA, Criminal 
Procedure Second Reissue, para. 20, Butterworths LexisNexis. 
 39.  To the extent that it is legitimate to (i) speak of a single “system”, and 
not of a mosaic of “systems”, at that time; and (ii) invoke the connotations of 
uniformity and regularity associated with a “system”.  
 40.  The date on which the Abolition of Feudal Tenure etc. (Scotland) Act 
2000 took effect. 
 41.  Abolition of Feudal Tenure etc. (Scotland) Act 2000, s.1. 
 42.  THE LAWS OF SCOTLAND: STAIR MEMORIAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA, Vol. 18, 
para. 113, Butterworths LexisNexis. 
 43.  Title Conditions (Scotland) Act 2003; Tenements (Scotland) Act 2004. 
 44.  Kenneth G.C. Reid, Vassals No More: Feudalism and Post-Feudalism 
in Scotland, EUR. REV. PRIV. L. 282, 300 (2003). 
 45.  Id. 
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C. Canon Law 
Canon law has left a significant legacy on Scots law and the 
Scottish legal system. Papal jurisdiction was exercised with regard 
to disputes in Scotland from at least as early as 1170.46 The Court 
of Session (or College of Justice), established in 1532 as the 
country's first (and surviving) central and characteristically judicial 
institution, comprised a bench split equally between spiritual and 
temporal appointees;47 those in the former category being canon 
lawyers. It was a rule, until 1579, that the President of the College 
of Justice should be a prelate.48 This distinction between spiritual 
and temporal appointees survived until 1640.49  
Canon lawyers were also active among the practitioner cohort. 
Some of these were particularly experienced,50 and John Cairns 
noted that by 1590 there had developed in Edinburgh a 
professionalised central civil court patronized by an organised 
legal profession “largely trained in the Roman and canon laws.”51 
A number of intrants to the Court had read both the canon and civil 
laws predominantly at continental European universities,52 though 
it appears that canon law was in fact taught prior to civil law at the 
University of St. Andrews.53  
 46.  See R.S. MYLNE, THE CANON LAW 9-10 (Morrison & Gibb 1912). 
 47.  ROBERT KERR HANNAY, THE COLLEGE OF JUSTICE 109 (William 
Hodge 1933); and see also the College of Justice Act 1532. 
 48.  HANNAY, supra note 47, at 107-109. 
 49.  John W. Cairns, Historical Introduction to 1 A HISTORY OF PRIVATE 
LAW IN SCOTLAND 86 (Kenneth Reid & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., Oxford 
Univ. Press 2003). 
 50.  See, for example, JOHN FINLAY, MEN OF LAW IN PRE-REFORMATION 
SCOTLAND 87 (Tuckwell Press 2000). 
 51.  John W. Cairns, Academic Feud, Bloodfeud, and William Welwood: 
Legal Education in St. Andrews, 1560-1611, 2 EDIN. L. REV. 158, 160 (1998). 
 52.  HANNAY, supra note 47, at 146-147; John W. Cairns, Importing our 
Lawyers from Holland: Netherlands Influences on Scots Law and Lawyers in the 
Eighteenth Century in SCOTLAND AND THE LOW COUNTRIES: 1124-1994, 141-
142 (Grant G. Simpson ed., Tuckwell Press 1996). 
 53.  William M. Gordon, Roman Law in Scotland in THE CIVIL LAW 
TRADITION IN SCOTLAND 19-20 (Robin Evans-Jones ed., Stair Society 1995). 
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Cairns also noted that canon lawyers were assisting litigants in 
secular disputes.54 Indeed, canon law commanded persuasive 
authority in the secular courts,55 and canonical materials were 
being cited in secular litigation as early as 1380.56 Even though 
canon law was regarded as the “fouler source” or “dunghill” in 
some circles,57 the institutional writer Sir Thomas Craig wrote that 
whenever a conflict arose between canon and Roman law, the 
former was preferred.58  
It has been said that the Scots law of marriage and testamentary 
succession were based on canon law,59 and that its influence on the 
law of obligations was “positive and direct”.60 The canonical 
tradition is also thought to have significantly influenced civil 
procedure in Scotland,61 perhaps influenced by the practice and 
procedure of the Sacra Rota Romana.62 In sum, Lord Cooper wrote 
of “the extent to which . . . Canonist traditions permeated the 
thinking of Scottish lawyers,” and noted that the “immense debt 
which Scots Law owes to Canon Law and Practice has never been 
sufficiently acknowledged.”63 The canonical tradition has also 
 54.  Cairns, supra note 49, at 31, 46 and 69-70. 
 55.  Gordon, supra note 53, at 23.  
 56.  Cairns, supra note 49, at 45. 
 57.  See David B. Smith, Canon Law in AN INTRODUCTORY SURVEY OF THE 
SOURCES AND LITERATURE OF SCOTS LAW 188 (Stair Society 1936). 
 58.  Abolition of Feudal Tenure etc. (Scotland) Act, I, 18, 17. 
 59.  J.J. Robertson, Canon Law as a Source in STAIR TERCENTENARY 
STUDIES 113 (David M. Walker ed., Stair Society 1981). 
 60.  W. David H. Sellar, Promise in 2 A HISTORY OF PRIVATE LAW IN 
SCOTLAND 266 (Kenneth Reid & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., Oxford Univ. 
Press 2004). 
 61.  See Cairns, supra note 49, at 63-64; Gordon, supra note 53, at 19-22; 
and J.J. Robertson, The Canon Law Vehicle of Civilian Influence with Particular 
Reference to Scotland in THE CIVILIAN TRADITION AND SCOTS LAW 117-133 
(David L. Carey Miller & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., Duncker & Humblot 
1997). 
 62.  See Robertson, supra note 61, at 121-125.  
 63.  LORD COOPER, SELECT SCOTTISH CASES OF THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY 
xxii (William Hodge 1944). 
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been described as “powerfully operative”,64 “longlasting[, and] . . . 
profound”65 in the Scottish legal system.  
D. Udal Law 
Norse settlers arrived on Orkney and Shetland, two 
archipelagos off the north east coast of the Scottish mainland, 
around 800. Under their rule, the islands were subject to Norse 
law, or “udal law”.  
“Udal” derives etymologically from the Old Norse “ođal”, 
meaning “ownership of inherited family property in which certain 
rights belong to the kin.”66 The term “udal law” is used in two 
senses: narrowly, by reference to the specific regime of land 
ownership from which it etymologically derives (sometimes 
referred to as udal tenure); and more broadly, by reference to 
Norse law as generally applied in Orkney and Shetland.67  
Udal law was maintained in Orkney and Shetland upon their 
transfer to Scotland in the mid-15th century. As part of the 
marriage arrangements of King James III of Scotland and 
Margaret, daughter of King Christian I of Denmark, the latter 
pledged the archipelagos in 1468 and 1469 respectively in lieu of a 
dowry. Even although Scottish customs and culture had growing 
influence on the islands, a parliamentary commission was of the 
view in 1567 that they should be subject to their own laws.68 The 
contrary view was expressed by the Privy Council in 1611, which 
 64.  HANNAY, supra note 47, at xiv and 107. 
 65.  W. David H. Sellar, A Historical Perspective in THE SCOTTISH LEGAL 
TRADITION 41 (New enlarged edition, Michael C. Meston, W. David H. Sellar & 
Lord Cooper eds., Alden Press 1991). 
 66.  Michael Jones, Udal Law and Contested Histories of Land Tenure and 
Landscape in Orkney and Shetland, 66(3) LATVIJAS ZINATNU AKADEMIJAS 
VESTIS 105, 109-110 (2012). 
 67.  William Jardine Dobie, Udal Law in AN INTRODUCTORY SURVEY, 
supra note 57, at 450; JONES, id. at 110. 
 68. T. THOMSON & C. INNES (EDS.), 3 ACTS OF THE PARLIAMENTS OF 
SCOTLAND 41 (12 vols, 1814–1875). 
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held that “foreign laws” were no further to be used in Orkney and 
Shetland.69  
One of the characteristic features of udal tenure was the 
allodial nature of land ownership, that is to say, its ownership by 
the “udaller” or “odalsman” without service being owed to a 
superior. This stood in contrast to the feudal system which was 
widespread in Scotland. The udaller was, however, under strong 
familial obligations with regard to disposition of land.  
In addition to the udal or “odal”, which was the hereditary 
estate itself, there were also common lands which belonged to the 
community and were used for pasture, water and so on. These 
appear to have been known as “commons” in Orkney and as 
“scattold” or “scattald” in Shetland.70 “Scat”, (from the Norse 
“skattr”, meaning “tax” or “tribute”) was paid annually for the udal 
lands in the form of butter, fish, oil and coarse cloth.71 Land could 
also be let by the udaller to a stranger for a payment of rent called 
a “leigu-burdr”.72  
Although udal tenure is an outstanding feature of the Orcadian 
and Shetlandic legal traditions, it did not exist to the complete 
exclusion of feudalism.73 In fact, feudalism came to increasingly 
displace udal tenure, such as with the Crown's feuing of the islands 
and inducing udallers to receive charters for the sake of having 
written title74—udal land titles were held rather by proof of 
possession. Other aspects of udal law and custom were displaced, 
such as the more feudalistic practice of primogeniture coming to 
supersede partition as the udal mode of succession.75  
 69. J.H. BURTON ET AL. (EDS.), 9 REGISTER OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL OF 
SCOTLAND 181-182 (38 vols., 1877–1970). 
 70.  See W.P. DREVER, UDAL LAW IN THE ORKNEYS AND ZETLAND 11 (W. 
Green 1914). 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  Id. at 3. 
 73.  Id. at 1. 
 74.  See id. at 4-6.  
 75.  Id. at 7. 
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Other characteristics of the udal legal tradition included rules 
on prescription,76 the mode in which proprietorial ownership was 
passed,77 a system of land measures (such as ouncelands and 
pennylands)78 and of weights and measures (such as pundlars, 
lispunds and cuttels),79 and the existence of a superior court called 
the “law-thing” (under the presidency of a “law-man”), with the 
decrees of island courts subject to review in Norway.80  
Much of this system of law has since departed, and the courts 
have ruled against its application in a handful of cases. In 1890, for 
example, the Court of Session denied that an udal custom, whereby 
proprietors in Shetland could demand a share of the value of 
whales stranded and killed on their land, had “the force of law.”81  
In an action brought by the Lord Advocate against the 
University of Aberdeen, with regard to ownership of Pictish 
antiquities excavated on St. Ninian's Isle, Shetland, the Court of 
Session held that “the law or rule of Magnus was not still the law 
of Scotland in the islands of Shetland.”82 This referred to a code 
attributed to King Magnus VI of Norway which was introduced 
around 1274, which would (it was alleged) be determinative of 
ownership; but it was not the sum of udal law. Of the state of udal 
law in general, Lord Patrick said that “the position was long ago 
reached where nothing could be said with certainty to remain of 
that law save udal tenure of land, scat, which was the return for 
udal lands, scattold, which was a right of commonty, and a few 
weights and measures.”83  
 76.  Id. at 8. 
 77.  Id. at 8-10. 
 78.  Or perhaps “systems” in the plural, as some measures had different 
values between the archipelagos, and it appears that land in Orkney was 
subdivided into much smaller units such as merks, uriscops and yowsworths—
see id. at 14-15. 
 79.  Or perhaps, again, “systems” in the plural. 
 80.  See Dobie, supra note 67, at 451-455. 
 81.  Bruce v Smith (1890) 17 R. 1000. 
 82.  Lord Advocate v University of Aberdeen, 1963 S.C. 533. 
 83.  Id. at 556, per Lord Patrick. 
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In a case in which questions arose as to the legal status of the 
seabed within the territorial waters around Shetland, the Court of 
Session declined to find in favour of the applicability of udal law 
to the seabed.84 Although it was argued that in Norway the seabed 
was subject to udal law in the same way as the foreshore, it was 
held that there was no (domestic) authority supporting that 
contention in Shetland. Udal law did not expressly deal with 
ownership of the seabed. In addition, as udal land titles were 
determined by proof of possession, rather than by writing, it 
seemed contrary to principle to expect that udal tenure should 
govern the seabed, which was permanently covered by sea water.85  
Whilst much of udal law has perished, udal tenure survives, 
being recognised both in statute86 and case law.87 Furthermore, the 
udal legal tradition may be said more generally to have resulted in 
some local differences as to the application or applicability of law. 
For example, there was judicial confirmation in 1907 that the 
feudal law on salmon fishing rights did not apply in Orkney.88 
There may also be implications arising from udal tenure for rights 
relating to the foreshore, cables, pipelines and fishing.  
Udal law comprised an additional legal tradition which was 
influential at least in one part of Scotland, and which does not fall 
 84.  Shetland Salmon Farmer Association v Crown Estate Commissioners, 
1991 S.L.T. 166. 
 85.  Id. at 183, per Lord McCluskey. 
 86.  Land Registration (Scotland) Act 1979, ss.2(1)(a)(v) and 3(3)(b); 
Abolition of Feudal Tenure etc. (Scotland) Act 2000, sch. 12, para. 39(2)(b); 
Housing Benefit Regulations 2006/213, art. 2(1); Housing Benefit (Persons who 
have attained the qualifying age for state pension credit) Regulations 2006/214, 
art. 2(1); Land Registration etc. (Scotland) Act 2012, s.50(5). It is stated in the 
explanatory notes to the Abolition of Feudal Tenure etc. (Scotland) Act 2000, at 
para. 183, that “Skat is a tribute under udal tenure which equates to feuduty 
under feudal tenure. In the case of skat, however, this would normally be 
payable directly to the Crown. Payment of skat has survived only on Orkney and 
Shetland”. 
 87.  See, for example, Short's Trustee v Keeper of the Registers of Scotland, 
1994 S.C. 122 at 128; Kaur v Singh, 1999 S.C. 180 at 187, 188 and 191; Yaxley 
v Glen, 2007 Hous.L.R. 59 at 64; and Trustees of the Elliot of Harwood Trust v 
Feakins, 2013 S.L.T. (Sh Ct) 108 at 116. See also Lerwick Harbour Trustees v 
Moar, 1951 S.L.T. (Sh Ct) 46 at 48. 
 88.  Lord Advocate v Balfour, 1907 S.C. 1360. 
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within the civilian/common law framework. In addition, it had to 
be conciliated with the law prevailing on the Scottish mainland, 
and this engaged both the law and institutions of the Scottish 
mainland. 
E. Celtic Law 
The content and extent of Celtic law observed in Scotland is 
obscured by a lack of documentary evidence. Among the few 
surviving documents are Adomnán's Law, from 697, which sets 
out laws on armed conflict for the protection of women and non-
combatants;89 and the Book of Deer, which in addition to mainly 
Christian texts, contains some records of grants of land. 
Notwithstanding the paucity of surviving written material, David 
Sellar has made a significant contribution to this otherwise little-
remarked pasture of Scottish legal history.  
Celtic law is understood as the law pertaining to communities 
speaking a Celtic language, rather than any specific ethnic group as 
such. Accordingly, Sellar noted that, of the four main peoples who 
inhabited Scotland—namely the Scots, Picts, Britons and Anglo-
Saxons90—only two, the Scots and the Britons, were Celtic 
peoples, and a third, the Picts, may have been to some extent.91  
Sellar has argued that “the story of Celtic law in Scotland did 
not come to an abrupt end with the advent of feudalism.”92 He 
illustrated a number of instances in which Celtic legal tradition 
appears to have made its way into the common or general law of 
 89.  W.D.H. Sellar, Law and Institutions: Gaelic in THE OXFORD 
COMPANION TO SCOTTISH HISTORY (Electronic version, Michael Lynch ed., 
Oxford Univ. Press 2001). 
 90.  The Scots, of Dál Riata, were predominantly found in the western 
coastal areas of Scotland. The Picts were mainly to the north of the River Forth 
and in the east of Scotland. The Britons were found in Strathclyde and the 
southwest of Scotland. The Anglo-Saxons were found in Northumbria, 
straddling the area to the southeast of the River Forth and part of what is now 
the northeast of England. 
 91.  Sellar, supra note 89. 
 92.  W.D.H. Sellar, Celtic Law and Scots Law: Survival and Integration, 29 
SCOTTISH STUD. 1, 20 (1989). 
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Scotland. For example, whenever the old regality and barony 
courts were repledging their jurisdiction over inhabitants from 
within their geographical jurisdiction whom had been accused 
before other courts, there was a requirement for a person to act in 
the capacity of a cautioner—in essence, a guarantor—called a 
“culrath” (or variant spellings thereof). Sellar explained that this 
represented a technical term of Celtic law, deriving from “cúl” 
meaning “back”, and “ráth” a “pledge” or “surety”, the etymology 
of the term providing a good explanation of its function in law.93 
He cited a number of cases from the 16th century in which this 
“culrath” was found, and an unsuccessful attempt at repledging as 
late as 1700.94  
Another instance of Celtic legal tradition was that of tanistry, 
namely, “[l]oosely defined . . . the name given to the system 
whereby succession to office, typically the office of king or 
chieftain, is open to various members, or to different segments, of 
a ruling kindred, rather than descending by primogeniture down 
the one line, as under feudal law.”95 Sellar cited instances of 
tanistry in Scotland from the 15th, 16th and 17th centuries,96 and 
stated that it was a “long lasting legal concept” which was 
“capable of being harmonized with others from a quite different 
background,” including the tutor in both feudal and Roman law.97  
Sellar gave a number of other illustrations, arguing that “[s]uch 
survivals are to be seen not as isolated curiosities, of antiquarian 
interest only, but as part of the very fabric of a legal system one of 
the outstanding features of which has been continuity with the 
past.”98 These suggest that Celtic law is another part of the mixture 
within the Scottish legal tradition. 
 93.  See id. at 15-16. 
 94.  Id. at 15. 
 95.  Id. at 13. 
 96.  Id. at 14. 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  Id. at 20. See also W.D.H. Sellar, Marriage, Divorce and Concubinage 
in Gaelic Scotland, 51 TRANSACTIONS OF THE GAELIC SOCIETY OF INVERNESS 
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F. The Bible 
The law of Scotland included part of the Bible. The most 
notable example was the Incest Act 1567, which prohibited incest 
by consanguinity and affinity with the degrees of relation “as is 
contenit in the xviij Cheptour of Leuiticus.” That is to say, the 18th 
chapter of Leviticus was directly incorporated as part of the Scots 
law of incest. What is all the more remarkable is that this state of 
affairs persisted until the repeal of the 1567 Act by the Incest and 
Related Offences (Scotland) Act 1986.  
It is not the only example of reliance on Biblical sources in 
Scots law. Sodomy and bestiality were punishable by death as 
criminal offences, not due to criminalising legislation, but because 
according to the Bible they constituted sins.99 More recently, the 
view was taken in a case from 1963 that two verses of the Book of 
Exodus may have been made part of the law of Scotland by a 
previous case with regard to liability for animals.100 In addition to 
these specific examples of reliance on the Bible, it has been argued 
that Christian theological doctrine, and Calvinist Presbyterianism 
in particular, significantly influenced Scots criminal law and its 
particular brand of moralism.101  
G. Foreign Maritime Law 
The High Court of Admiralty was one Scotland's central 
courts, in existence until its jurisdiction was transferred to the 
Court of Session by statute in 1830.102 It commanded jurisdiction 
464 (1978-1980), on evidence of Celtic secular marriage in Scotland until the 
17th century. 
 99.  Chloe Kennedy, Criminal Law and Religion in Post-Reformation 
Scotland, 16(2) EDIN. L. REV. 178, 183 (2012). 
 100.  Henderson v John Stuart (Farms) Limited, 1963 S.C. 245 at 249, per 
Lord Hunter; with reference to Milligan v Henderson, 1915 S.C. 1030. 
 101.  See generally Kennedy, supra note 99. 
 102.  Court of Session Act 1830, s.21. 
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over prize,103 maritime and admiralty affairs, both civil and 
criminal. 
It was stated by Thomas Callander Wade that the law 
administered by the High Court of Admiralty was “the customary 
law of the sea, and not necessarily the ordinary law of the land . . . 
a sort of general law of the sea based on the jus gentium and 
customs of seafaring men.”104 These were formally expressed in 
various codes, the most authoritative of which was said to have 
been the 13th century105 Rôles d'Oléron, (of which there were 
Scots translations106) which had application throughout 
Northwestern Europe. Edda Frankot argued that one can “assume 
that the Rôles d'Oléron were part of the central body of medieval 
Scottish law,”107 and that although there is “no specific evidence 
that the Rôles were adopted as the official Scottish sea law... that 
the extant copies are all part of compilations of the main Scottish 
laws does suggest that they were in common use throughout the 
country.”108 Wade also stated that the Lex Rhodia (used primarily 
in the Mediterranean), incorporated in the Digest of Justinian, (and 
therefore in “Roman law”), was “if not … authoritative, at least … 
a useful guide.”109 There may also have been knowledge in 
Scotland of the Gotland or Wisby Sea Law,110 primarily used in 
the Baltic.  
 103.  Prize jurisdiction is that over enemy property seized or captured at sea. 
 104.  THOMAS CALLANDER WADE (ed.), ACTA CURIAE ADMIRALLATUS 
SCOTIAE xix (Stair Society 1937). 
 105.  See EDDA FRANKOT, “OF LAWS OF SHIPS AND SHIPMEN”: MEDIEVAL 
MARITIME LAW AND ITS PRACTICE IN URBAN NORTHERN EUROPE 11 (Edinburgh 
Univ. Press 2012). 
 106.  Edda Frankot, Medieval Maritime Law from Oléron to Wisby: 
Jurisdictions in the Law of the Sea in COMMUNITIES IN EUROPEAN HISTORY: 
REPRESENTATIONS, JURISDICTIONS, CONFLICTS 164 (Juan Pan-Montojo & 
Frederik Pedersen eds., Pisa Univ. Press 2007). See also FRANKOT, supra note 
105, at 81-85. 
 107.  Frankot, supra note 106, at 164. 
 108.  FRANKOT, supra note 105, at 13. 
 109.  WADE, supra note 104, at xix. 
 110.  Frankot, supra note 106, at 164; though see FRANKOT, supra note 105, 
at 88. 
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The sources of maritime and admiralty law in Scotland were 
considered by some of the institutional writers. Viscount Stair 
noted that “the rule by which the Lords have always proceeded in 
the matter of prizes hath been the law and custom of nations,” and 
that “the Lords . . . do not exclude the defence of strangers . . . 
though that be a rule by our custom, but do proceed according to 
the common law of nations.”111 George Joseph Bell stated that 
Scots maritime law “partakes more of the character of international 
law than any other branch of jurisprudence,” noting that “in all the 
discussions on this subject in our Courts, the continental 
collections and treaties on this subject, and the English books of 
reports, have been received as authority by our Judges, where not 
unfitted for our adoption by any peculiarity which our practice 
does not recognize.”112 He listed, by order of authority in that 
regard: first, foreign maritime codes and laws (the Rhodian laws, Il 
Consolato del Mare, the laws of Oléron and Wisby, the Ordinances 
of the Hanseatic Towns, Le Guidon de la Mer, the Ordonnance de 
la Marine, and the Code de Commerce); second, the decisions of 
foreign maritime and mercantile courts (in particular the High 
Court of Admiralty in England, the mercantile court of Genoa, the 
supreme civil courts of Friesland, and the courts of Holland); and 
third, the works of foreign writers in maritime law.113  
These suggest a broad array of non-Scottish sources in use in 
maritime and admiralty causes in the Scottish courts, which do not 
appear to align with a simple civilian/common law dichotomy. 
 
 
 111.  STAIR, INSTITUTIONS, II, 2, 6; with the “Lords” (i.e. the Court of 
Session) nevertheless observing treaties between the King and his allies, “in so 
far as they differ from the common law of nations”. 
 112.  GEORGE JOSEPH BELL, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF SCOTLAND 
AND ON THE PRINCIPLES OF MERCANTILE JURISPRUDENCE 497-498 (5th ed., 
William Blackwood 1826). 
 113.  Id. at 498-502. Several foreign sources are cited by A.R.G. McMillan, 
Admiralty and Maritime Law in AN INTRODUCTORY SURVEY, supra note 57, at 
325. 
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III. TRADITIONS OF LAW IN SCOTLAND: MODERN 
There is another dimension to the concept of a mixed legal 
system which has not gone unacknowledged in the literature,114 but 
which should be emphasised as potentially further disturbing a 
simple civilian and common law dichotomy. That is the extent to 
which two modern streams of law or legal tradition have 
permeated the Scottish legal order: the law of the European Union 
(EU) and the law on the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR). Other “external” streams of law may be making their way 
into Scots law, such as aspects of modern international law, but the 
EU and ECHR dimensions have arguably had a particularly 
extensive impact on domestic Scots law, and for that reason those 
two streams of law will be selected for comment. 
A. European Union Law 
Scotland, along with the other UK jurisdictions, became 
subject to the law of the European Communities upon the coming 
into effect of the European Communities Act 1972. The norms, 
processes and institutions of the European Communities were 
gradually developed to the far-reaching extent of the European 
Union of the present day. Through directives, regulations and other 
legal instruments, much EU-generated law has filtered into and 
shaped domestic law in Scotland, as it has elsewhere in the EU. 
Moreover, the European Court of Justice serves as the highest 
court in matters of EU law, its decisions serving both an 
interpretive and adjudicative function with the potential to have 
far-reaching consequences for domestic law. 
 114.  See, for example, Örücü, supra note 8, at at 10, 12 and 14; and Chris 
Himsworth, Scotland: The Constitutional Protection of a Mixed Legal System in 
ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS, THREE LEGAL ORDERS – PERSPECTIVES OF 
EVOLUTION: ESSAYS ON MACAU'S AUTONOMY AFTER THE RESUMPTION OF 
SOVEREIGNTY BY CHINA 120 (Jorge Costa Oliveira & Paulo Cardinal eds., 
Springer 2009). 
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The substantive reach of EU law is wide, including such 
diverse fields as education, employment, health and safety, 
consumer protection, financial regulation, companies, competition, 
intellectual property and data protection. It has also established 
extensive frameworks relating to the free movement of persons, 
goods, capital and services, which have implications across several 
areas of law. 
Whilst it is true that EU law does not regulate everything in the 
domestic legal sphere, and that it is often implemented through 
media of national law and institutions, as in the case of directives, 
it cannot fail to be considered as a major source of law in the 
evolving Scottish legal tradition. It brings, indeed, another legal 
tradition to Scotland as manifested in the norms, systems, 
processes, practices and institutions of the EU—a tradition which 
is not confined to a single area of law. The civilian/common law 
dichotomy is at risk of looking outdated in the context of such a 
pregnant legal tradition as that of the EU; one which stretches 
across much of Europe. The EU legal order indeed has great 
potential for legal convergence or “harmonisation” across the 
member state jurisdictions, buttressed by the judicial clout of the 
European Court of Justice.115 This is a major dimension which 
must surely feature in a modern sources of law and legal traditions 
discussion. 
B. European Convention on Human Rights Law 
The law and jurisprudence on the European Convention on 
Human Rights is another distinct stream of law or emerging legal 
tradition.  
The ECHR was ratified by the UK in 1951, but was not 
formally introduced into the domestic legal space until the 
enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998. Under that regime, 
 115.  This potential for legal convergence or harmonisation is sometimes 
seen as a medium or catalyst by which a new European ius commune can be 
achieved.  
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courts and tribunals in the UK must “take into account” the 
judgments, decisions, declarations and advisory opinions of the 
European Court of Human Rights;116 they must interpret primary 
and secondary legislation in a manner that it is compatible with 
Convention rights;117 and they can declare that legislation is 
incompatible with the Convention.118 It is unlawful for public 
authorities, which includes courts and tribunals, to act in a manner 
that is incompatible with Convention rights.119 If a Minister of the 
Crown considers that there are compelling reasons for doing so, he 
may by order make such amendments to legislation that has been 
declared incompatible, as he considers necessary to remove the 
incompatibility.120  
The human rights framework has had an additional dimension 
in Scotland: Acts of the Scottish Parliament are deemed by the 
Scotland Act 1998 to be “not law” to the extent that they 
contravene Convention rights.121 The ECHR indeed bears on the 
very legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament.  
The ECHR legal framework as implemented in the UK is thus 
an overarching one, bearing on the way in which public authorities 
conduct their activities, the way in which courts interpret 
legislation, and even the way in which the Scottish Parliament can 
legislate. There is, moreover, not only a statutory framework in the 
form of the Human Rights Act, but an ever-growing body of 
human rights jurisprudence both in the domestic courts and the 
European Court of Human Rights. These stimulate a deep well of 
human rights law and jurisprudence which does not appear to 
resonate with a simple civilian/common law analysis. 
Before the “traditions of law” part of this article is left behind, 
there is an open question which should be posed: how would we 
 116.  Human Rights Act 1998, s.2. 
 117.  Id. at s.3. 
 118.  Id. at s.4. 
 119.  Id. at s.6. 
 120.  Id. at s.10. 
 121.  Scotland Act 1998, s.29. 
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characterise those great areas of law, especially statutory law, 
which do not seem readily to correspond with the aforementioned 
traditions? Are the many statutes which regulate fields as diverse 
as pensions, social security, health and safety at work and road 
traffic to be regarded as expressions of the (English) common law 
tradition? Are they somehow connected to the civilian tradition? 
Or are they in some other category, perhaps a more general 
“modern statutory law” category, whether of Scotland or the wider 
UK? Furthermore, what import might devolution hold for this: is 
legislation of the Scottish Parliament spawning a nascent legal 
tradition, distinct from that of the UK Parliament?  
These questions, whatever their answers, lead into essential 
issues of methodology.  
IV. REQUIREMENT FOR AN HOLISTIC ANALYSIS 
Whether or not it is correct to say that the civilian and common 
law traditions are the dual foundations or building blocks of Scots 
law, those are clearly only part of the story when it comes to 
describing Scotland as a mixed jurisdiction. As Chris Himsworth 
observed, “the Scottish system is inadequately described simply as 
a mix of common law and civil law.”122 Other traditions have 
occupied their own place in Scottish legal tradition, including some 
with considerable legacy, such as canon law. It is only by means of 
an holistic analysis that we can achieve a more faithful statement 
of the character of the law and legal system as a whole, beyond its 
prima facie civilian and common law parts. 
The first question to be clarified is one which goes to the heart 
of the methodology employed in evaluating mixture in legal 
traditions. If the principal traditions of law in Scotland are civilian 
and common law in nature (and it would have to be shown how 
that is so), then this might form the basis for an argument that 
those should form the backbone of the analysis. Perhaps the Celtic 
 122.  Himsworth, supra note 114, at 122. 
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or udal law traditions are not worth bothering about because they 
seem so remote or marginal, or because their modern relevance 
seems so slight. This is essentially a quantitative approach whereby 
the analysis seems driven by a search for the size of a legal 
tradition's footprint: the civilian and common law traditions merit 
the most attention because theirs is the “largest” contribution. 
It seems that even a quantitative approach must be at least 
partly qualitative, however. In measuring canon law against feudal 
law, for example, one must surely take account of the fact that the 
canon law influence is arguably the more enduring—in civil 
procedure, and so on.  
If one insists on a strict definition of mixture, however, a 
tradition seems worthy of attention whether its contribution is 50% 
or 5%. Of course, we may be tempted, and even justified, in 
affording the 50% more consideration than the 5%; but should we 
then demote the 5% from our analysis, or from the principal axis of 
assessment, simply because it is 5% and not 50%? It sometimes 
appears that this is what happens in the mixed jurisdiction 
literature, with traditions bearing a smaller footprint overshadowed 
by a debate over which of the two major contributions, civilian or 
common law, first penetrated Scotland, or which was the more 
influential. A legal tradition is the sum of its constituent parts, and 
any exclusion of its constituent traditions from the discussion is an 
omission. It encourages an incomplete or distorted evaluation of 
the receiving legal tradition. 
A second issue in methodology is our attitude toward the 
temporal aspect of the analysis. In particular, to what extent is, or 
should, our approach be time-bound? Are we relaxed about 
timelines, or eager to keep “updating” our evaluation of Scottish 
legal tradition with each development? Should we, for example, 
regard feudal law as a minor contributor to Scottish legal tradition 
now that feudal tenure has finally been abolished? Should it have 
been demoted in our analysis when the Abolition of Feudal Tenure 
etc. (Scotland) Act 2000 came into effect? Or should it continue to 
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feature prominently in our analysis because it still underpinned 
land ownership in Scotland until quite recently, and indeed because 
Scotland was remarkably placed in Europe in having a system of 
feudal tenure in place at such a late date? Do we continue to 
recognise the extent to which feudal law made land ownership in 
Scotland distinctive, or look upon it as an historical artefact? If, 
incidentally, we opt for an approach of continual updating, the time 
may have come to challenge a straight civilian and common law 
dichotomy as “outdated” in light of the aforementioned EU and 
ECHR contexts.  
The temporal dimension leads into another question: how do 
we assess legacy? A meaningful contemporary analysis should 
probably not be concerned with bygone traditions that were once 
observed somewhere in the land we now call Scotland, but which 
are firmly extinct. Instead, we should be concerned with those 
which have left some footprint on Scots law or the Scottish legal 
system. 
The question of legacy is, however, far from straightforward. 
How, for example, would we assess the legacy of feudal law in 
Scotland? To what extent has the abolition of feudal tenure 
diminished the feudal legacy? Clearly the active feudal component 
of Scots law has waned, but does that signify a corresponding 
diminution in legacy? It is perhaps too superficial to suggest that 
the legacy of feudal law is present only to the extent that feudal 
components are present, active and visible in the system. 
Somewhere between the extremes of the defunct legal tradition, 
and that which is still in obvious operation, is a grey area where a 
tradition is no longer observed in its own terms, but the legacy of 
which lingers on. To what extent has feudal law influenced the 
Scottish legal tradition in the longer term? To what extent has it 
bequeathed deeper conceptual, methodological or structural 
elements to the legal order? How different would Scots law, 
including property law and jurisdiction, look today had feudal law 
never arrived on Scottish shores? 
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The question of legacy is further complicated by another 
phenomenon: legal traditions are not discrete. Aspects of one 
tradition may, and are perhaps even likely to, inform, shape, alter 
or influence others with which they have contact. They are and 
have been incorporated into others. That is evident in the very 
concept of a “Scottish legal tradition” embodying aspects of other 
legal traditions,—civilian, canonical and so on. It is also evident 
from the literature; Hector MacQueen and David Sellar wrote, for 
example, that “from the time of its emergence in the Middle Ages, 
the common law of Scotland has been open to influence from both 
the common law and the civilian tradition. It has been a ‘mixed’ 
system from the very beginning.”123 In other words, the civilian 
and common law traditions were both received into a third entity: 
the Scottish common law. It was not the case that these two 
traditions arrived in a vacuum, and that the two combined to 
produce a Scottish legal tradition. Whilst that might seem obvious, 
it is immediately apparent why it is unsatisfactory to measure 
“mixture” by principal reference to the two received traditions 
(civilian and common law), but not the receiving tradition (Scottish 
common law). 
The indiscrete or “impure” reality of legal traditions demands 
that we revisit the temporal aspect. Consider, in particular, the 
extent to which the timelines of the various legal traditions 
overlap, and then the corresponding improbability that these 
traditions would, or could, be kept discrete. Of the traditions 
discussed in this article, the most ancient to be observed in 
“Scotland” is Celtic law. This significantly predated the Christian 
era, and as outlined, aspects of Celtic law survived in Scotland 
until as late as the 17th century. By then, a number of other 
traditions were already coexisting in Scotland. Feudalism may 
have arrived as early as the end of the 11th century. A Scottish 
 123.  H.L. MacQueen & W.D.H. Sellar, Unjust Enrichment in Scots Law in 
UNJUST ENRICHMENT: THE COMPARATIVE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF 
RESTITUTION 289 (E.J.H. Schrage ed., Duncker & Humblot 1995). 
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common law was in existence by at least the mid-13th century. It 
has been said that this was modelled after English common law to 
such an extent that it is “legitimate . . . to speak of a Reception.”124 
Canon law commanded sufficient authority in Scotland to be cited 
in secular cases by 1380. The Roman tradition may have begun to 
indirectly influence Scots law from the 13th century,125 and Scots 
lawyers were being educated in civil law at continental European 
universities from the 14th century.126 Even before one folds the 
udal, Biblical or diverse maritime legal traditions into the analysis, 
the temporal overlap among these traditions is clear. 
The coexistence or cohabitation of these traditions was unlikely 
to be—indeed, was not—politely discrete. The picture that 
emerges is not only one in which civilian and common law were 
but two of several traditions; but one of, to adopt a fitting term 
used by Örücü, “encounter and combination”.127 The traditions 
would perhaps inevitably compete, compare, borrow, lend, 
analogise, innovate, imitate, overlap, contaminate; in short, mix.  
This is borne out by some initial evidence which could form a 
separate topic of research in its own right: the extent to which the 
constituent traditions of Scots law were or are “impure”. As 
crossovers, mutations and adaptations occurred, aspects of 
traditions would be absorbed into others and even be conveyed by 
them. Canon law may be taken as an example. Canon law was 
heavily influenced by the Roman law tradition from as early as the 
4th century,128 and continued to be influenced in a variety of ways 
in the centuries that followed.129 The European ius commune was 
essentially a product of cross-pollination between the canon law 
 124.  Sellar, supra note 13, at at 6. 
 125.  Gordon, supra note 53, at 15 et seq. 
 126.  Id. at 19-20. 
 127.  Örücü, supra note 8, at 5. 
 128.  See JAMES A. CORIDON, AN INTRODUCTION TO CANON LAW 11-19 
(Geoffrey Chapman 1991). 
 129.  See, for example, JAMES A. BRUNDAGE, MEDIEVAL CANON LAW 59-60 
(Longman 1995); Robertson, supra note 59, at 112-115; and JOSEPH DODD, A 
HISTORY OF CANON LAW 134-135 (Parker, London 1884). 
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and Roman law traditions.130 As such, the practise of canon law 
often meant indirectly drawing on the Roman law tradition. In 
other words, aspects of civilian tradition were conveyed through 
canon law131 before there was a more direct reception of the 
civilian tradition in Scots law. Nevertheless, the canonical tradition 
is excluded from the principal axis of civilian and common law 
assessment in the orthodox mixed jurisdiction methodology. 
Canon law is not alone in its apparent “impurity”. The Scottish 
common law was, as noted, open to influence from the English 
common law and civilian traditions,132 and was also penetrated by 
the canon law of arbitration.133 The evolving Scots feudal tradition, 
including its more formal and customary aspects, drew upon the 
English feudal tradition, and may also have drawn upon traditions 
from parts of continental Europe such as Normandy, Brittany and 
Flanders.134 It has also been argued to have been reinforced by the 
Scottish common law and shaped by the European ius commune,135 
and the system of feudal tenure may even have incorporated 
aspects of Celtic legal tradition.136  
Even the two great traditions often cast as adversaries, civilian 
and common law, failed to be discrete: English common law, for 
example, appears to have been influenced by civil law, canon 
law,137 and even Celtic law.138 It is likewise implausible that civil 
law stood insulated from the influence of other legal traditions, and 
not least from the canonical tradition. The ius commune is just one 
aspect of that. Accordingly, even although each tradition has been 
 130.  ANDERS WINROTH, THE MAKING OF GRATIAN'S DECRETUM 196 
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2000). 
 131.  See David B. Smith, Roman Law in AN INTRODUCTORY SURVEY, supra 
note 57, at 172; and Robertson, supra note 61. 
 132.  See MacQueen & Sellar, supra note 123. 
 133.  GODFREY, supra note 17, at 363-364 and 373. 
 134.  MacQueen, supra note 33, at 12-14. 
 135.  See id. at 17-26.  
 136.  See, for example, Sellar, supra note 92, at 6-7. 
 137.  See, for example, David J. Seipp, The Reception of Canon Law and 
Civil Law in the Common Law Courts before 1600, 13(3) OXFORD J. LEGAL 
STUD. 388 (1993). 
 138.  See Sellar, supra note 92, at 13. 
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separately identified and discussed in the foregoing part of this 
article, this has been done for taxonomic convenience only, and 
should not give the impression that these traditions were at all 
times separate and discrete. They are separately identified 
precisely to highlight the diversity of the Scottish legal tradition of 
which they became constituent ingredients. 
Even if it were the case that the civilian and common law 
traditions were the two great streams which emerged from this 
clutter of traditions, they were by that stage, whenever it could be 
said to have occurred, quite impure. The extent to which they were 
impure, or bore the marks of other traditions, is not for this 
contribution to assess; but it is clear that the idea of a civilian and 
common law template with which to measure the character or 
imprint of Scots law becomes less plausible when these 
considerations are taken into account. If aspects of one legal 
tradition were mixed up with, or latent in, other legal traditions, the 
question arises as to the point at which aspects of the former 
tradition become aspects of the latter tradition. When one feature is 
incorporated into a conveying or vehicular tradition, to what extent 
is the bequeathing tradition removed from the equation? Has that 
feature now passed into the claim (or even definition) of the 
receiving tradition, or has it merely acquired the colour or veneer 
of a conveying tradition? 
Moreover, if aspects of one tradition become conveyed through 
multiple traditions, how are we to characterise those elements? As 
noted, the civilian tradition was not only received in its own right, 
but also through canon law, and perhaps through other traditions; 
even the English common law tradition. It becomes hugely 
difficult to separate out all of the civilian strands from the 
conveying traditions.  
Further still, to the extent that civilian elements survive in 
Scots law, they are collectively conveyed through Scottish legal 
tradition. The civilian tradition is, of course, conveyed in other 
jurisdictions, too, bearing the marks and idiosyncrasies of those 
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conveying traditions. As such, which version of civilian tradition is 
to be regarded as the “most civilian”? In other words, do civilian 
elements not acquire and become bound up in their conveying 
traditions such that it becomes decreasingly meaningful to speak 
about a single civilian tradition? Or is the discussion purely 
historical or genealogical, such that there is regarded as some end 
point after which the civilian tradition is either “deceased” or 
regarded as something different? 
If therefore, the basic argument is that Scotland is a mixed 
jurisdiction because it combines the civilian and common law 
traditions, the concept of mixture is revealed as selective and 
reductionist. First, as noted, Scots law also incorporates aspects of 
other legal traditions. Second, even were it convincingly 
demonstrated that its dual foundations or basic building blocks are 
civilian and common law in nature, those foundations have 
themselves been the subjects of mixing, distortion, contamination, 
evolution and so on. Neither is purely civilian nor common law in 
its own right. Third, the Scottish legal tradition, like all extant 
traditions, is a living tradition. It evolves and undergoes change. 
Even if it was the case that the civilian and common law 
inheritances were the dual foundations or basic building blocks of 
Scots law, they have not necessarily remained so. In particular, a 
serious contemporary analysis cannot avoid accounting for the EU 
and ECHR traditions, and considering the extent to which they 
might dilute or further enrich the mixture of existing traditions. 
Furthermore, serious consideration should be given to how a great 
deal of modern statutory law is to be classified. Finally, the very 
receiving of aspects of the civilian and common law traditions was 
at least partly achieved by way of conveyance through other 
traditions. Those conveying traditions are then excluded from the 
basic dichotomy, even although they played a role in the very 
manifestation of certain civilian and common law elements. 
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Perhaps the civilian and common law dichotomy remains a 
valuable tool in the comparative private139 law context. Perhaps if 
all systems were regarded as mixed, in its broadest sense, then one 
of the principal tools of comparison would be discarded, and the 
special nature of the mixed jurisdiction category lost.  
However, the dichotomy faces significant methodological 
challenges, and is at risk of tempting a distorted and exaggerated 
picture of Scots law and the Scottish legal tradition. It also 
arguably offers limited scope in a global comparative law context. 
If the world is truly a patchwork, not only of civilian and common 
law traditions, but of varying shapes and shades of canon, Celtic, 
Norse, Norman, Islamic, Talmudic, Chinese, Adat, socialist, tribal, 
customary law, and so on—how meaningful is a civilian and 
common law dichotomous approach to the question of mixed 
jurisdiction? Or is the mixed jurisdiction analysis intended for a 
more limited, European and private law audience?140 The very 
nature of taxonomy may require that regarding every system as a 
mixed system is against the spirit of the exercise, but the taxonomy 
should not be any more reductionist than is unavoidable; either in 
the sense of how many traditions are represented, or the extent to 
which traditions are or can be regarded as pure or discrete. 
If, however, there is still value in approaching questions of 
comparative law by reference to a civilian and common law 
yardstick, and in continuing to identify Scotland as one of the 
quintessential mixed jurisdictions, that reference to mixture should, 
at very least, not be perceived to exhaust the definition. It serves 
just one analytical framework, which neither shows the full extent 
of mixture within this particular mixed jurisdiction, nor which 
properly scrutinises the other legal traditions which may constitute 
part of the mixture, including those which played a role in 
conveying or influencing civilian and common law ingredients. 
 139.  See infra section IV. 
 140.  Id. 
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V. OVER-EMPHASIS ON PRIVATE LAW? 
The literature discussing the detail and extent of Scotland's 
mixed legal heritage has focused primarily141 on private law.142  
It may be asked why it is that the topic of Scotland as a mixed 
jurisdiction has been examined primarily in a private law context. 
A plausible answer is simply that it has captured the interest of 
private lawyers much more than that of public lawyers. As the field 
receives more private law contributions, perhaps public and 
criminal lawyers do not regard this as a subject for them, that they 
have little to contribute to a field heavily aligned with a private law 
analysis.  
Perhaps there is a different, or additional, reason: if Scots law 
is more distinctive from its English counterpart in the field of 
private law than in public law, then private law may be the natural 
focal point, because it is potentially where the distinctiveness 
factor is at its most pronounced.143 If that were the reason, or a 
reason, the literature would benefit from clarification on this point, 
and would in that case surely have to include more consideration 
 141.  Though not exclusively. See, for example, a brief comment on public 
law and criminal law in Sellar, supra note 13, at 8-9; a private law take on what 
is typically conceived as a public law area in Hector L. MacQueen, Human 
Rights and Private Law in Scotland: A Response to President Barak, 78 TUL. L. 
REV. 363 (2003); and MIXED LEGAL SYSTEMS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE: 
PROPERTY AND OBLIGATIONS IN SCOTLAND AND SOUTH AFRICA, (Reinhard 
Zimmermann, Daniel Visser & Kenneth Reid eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2004), in 
which there are references to human rights law in the chapter on nuisance by 
François du Bois and Elspeth Reid. An exception to the general trend, which 
comes rather from a public law perspective, is Himsworth, supra note 114, at 
119-141; and see also Esin Örücü, Approaching Public Law as a “Mixed 
System”, JUR. REV. 131 (2002).  
 142.  See, for example, Robin Evans-Jones, Unjust Enrichment, Contract and 
the Third Reception of Roman law in Scotland, 109 L.Q. REV. 663 (1993); 
Evans-Jones, supra note 13; Robin Evans-Jones, Roman law in Scotland and 
England and the Development of one Law for Britain, 115 L.Q. REV. 605 
(1999); George L. Gretton, Reception Without Integration? Floating Charges 
and Mixed Systems, 78 TUL. L. REV. 307 (2003); MacQueen, supra note 1; 
Hector MacQueen, Unjustified Enrichment in Mixed Legal Systems, 13 
RESTITUTION L. REV. 21 (2005); Whitty, supra note 7; and Zimmermann, Visser 
& Reid, supra note 141. 
 143.  This may be the suggestion of MacQueen, supra note 1, at 317. 
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of non-private law areas, such as public law and criminal law, in 
order to arrive at such a conclusion. 
We therefore find that the mixed jurisdiction discussion is 
dominated by some quite particular attributes. First, the main focus 
in terms of pedigree is on the civilian and common law traditions. 
The contributors to the literature have certainly not been ignorant 
of other traditions.144 On the contrary, some have made significant 
contributions on other legal traditions, such as Hector MacQueen 
on the Scottish common law,145 and David Sellar on Celtic law.146 
However, for whatever reason, these have tended not to be folded 
into the wider mixed jurisdiction literature. 
Second, the main focus in terms of area of law has firmly been 
that of private law. It is not that public law or criminal law aspects 
have gone unremarked—again, we find these occasionally 
mentioned in the literature.147 However, the field is dominated by 
private law oriented analysis. It is through a private law lens that 
the evaluation of the mixed character of Scots law has been made. 
These comments are not intended to diminish the valuable 
work that has been invested in the private law literature. The 
suggestion is rather that, if and until other areas of law are properly 
accounted for, it may be appropriate for private law contributions 
to explicitly confine themselves to private law, and be cautious 
about purporting to speak to the nature of the wider law and legal 
system in general terms. Some of the scholarship has been 
sensitive to this very point. Kenneth Reid and Reinhard 
 144.  See, for example, acknowledgement of other legal traditions in Kenneth 
Reid & Reinhard Zimmermann, The Development of Legal Doctrine in a Mixed 
System in Reid & Zimmermann, supra note 49, at 2-3 and 7. Reid and 
Zimmermann also described the “deeply entrenched and irreducible chasm 
between the civil law and common law traditions” as “exaggerated”, and, even 
within the “civil law systems”, such a dichotomy “is in danger of underrating 
[their] diversity”—id. at 2-3. Notwithstanding these observations, the 
contribution in question still primarily orientates its “mixed” analysis on civilian 
and common law fault lines. 
 145.  MACQUEEN, supra note 23. 
 146.  Sellar, supra note 92, at 20; Sellar, supra note 98. 
 147.  See supra note 141. 
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Zimmermann, for example, were clear that the two-volume work 
of which they were editors, A History of Private Law in Scotland, 
was not a “full history of legal doctrine in Scotland,” but was 
instead, “confined to private law and within private law to selected 
topics from the law of property and the law of obligations.”148 
What seems apparent is a potential usefulness of the mixed 
jurisdiction category to comparative lawyers as a study in 
approximating or conciliating civilian and common law traditions 
in the private law sphere.149 That is different, however, from a 
general description of Scots law or the Scottish legal system as 
“mixed”, whether in general or in terms of a mixture of civilian 
and common law constituents, beyond the significant but limited 
sphere of private law.  
The orientation of the discussion in the field of private law may 
be self-reinforcing, both a cause and an effect of further private 
law contributions. Whatever the reason for the topic's principal 
orientation toward private law, the paucity of non-private law 
contributions cannot bode well for the probability that our 
conclusions are sufficiently holistic. The discussion becomes 
lopsided. The risk arises that the literature purports to describe, or 
is taken to describe, the whole of Scots law and the Scottish legal 
tradition; whilst in fact substantially discussing only private law 
material. In other words, there is a risk that the mixed character of 
Scots private law is extrapolated to the four corners of the legal 
order; that the character of a part of the law is used to suggest the 
character of the whole. 
The literature is therefore in the odd position of having created 
a restricted analysis (civilian vs. common law; private law) which 
has been too liberally applied to the law and legal system at large. 
The mixed pedigree of Scots private law is not in dispute, though 
the extent to which it is mixed is disputed. Expanding the 
 148.  Reid & Zimmermann, supra note 144, at 9. 
 149.  See id. at 3-4, though the language used is still one of “legal systems” 
rather than bodies of private law. 
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discussion to one which embraces, rather than glosses over, public 
law and criminal law will enrich the analysis and improve both its 
accuracy and its holistic viability. Even were Scots public and 
criminal law found to be plain expressions of some single legal 
tradition (quite unlikely, of course), then we would at least know 
that private law is where the mixed pedigree is found. What seems 
more probable is that an evaluation of public, criminal and other 
areas of law would reveal a further enriching mixture of traditions 
which make up the Scottish legal tradition as a whole.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
Scotland is a mixed jurisdiction in the sense that it combines a 
mixed pedigree of legal traditions. It is well remarked that Scots 
law includes inheritances from the civilian and common law 
traditions, and often that combination is precisely why Scots law is 
described as “mixed”.  
However, the literature has tended to focus on the civilian and 
common law traditions, often to the exclusion or significant 
relegation of other constituent traditions. The mixture also includes 
aspects of, at least, the Scottish common law, feudal law, canon 
law, udal law, Celtic law, the Bible and foreign maritime law. 
Holistic considerations may require that these other traditions are 
folded into an analysis of Scotland as a mixed jurisdiction; not 
only because they coexist with aspects of the civilian and common 
law traditions, but because these traditions have, for centuries, 
mixed with each other. The traditions are neither discrete nor pure, 
and have informed, influenced and shaped others. Some have 
conveyed aspects of others. The extent to which the literature has 
focused on the civilian and common law traditions is at risk of 
insufficiently recognising or accounting for these phenomena. 
The orthodox civilian and common law dichotomy may also 
struggle to deal with EU law and ECHR law as two modern 
streams of law which are not only making substantial headway in 
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Scotland, but in other jurisdictions too. Are EU and ECHR law 
civilian or common law in nature? Are they, themselves, mixed in 
pedigree? Or are they neither? The same questions may be asked 
of large areas of modern statutory law. 
The picture of Scotland as a mixed jurisdiction is one of a very 
mixed jurisdiction; one which has received and been influenced by 
a number of indiscrete legal traditions. Comparative lawyers may 
still find value in upholding Scotland as a quintessentially mixed 
jurisdiction in the private law sphere, combining civilian and 
common law traditions, but these traditions bear the marks of each 
other, and of other traditions which they have encountered. 
Furthermore, even if they were found to account for a majority of 
the mixture, they comprise just part of a wider array of heritages 
which, together, make up the Scottish legal tradition. 
 
 
